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FRAUD IN FEDERAL INCOME TAX
MYRON L. GORDON
IMPORTANCE OF TAX FRAUDS TODAY
The United States Supreme Court has said that fraud penalties
"act in terrorern upon parties whose conscientious scruples are not
sufficient to balance their hopes of profit."'
Fraud problems are ever increasing for a variety of reasons. Many
cases arose and will continue to arise out of the sudden war profits and
black market operations which existed during the war years. The high
rates of income taxes during recent years, coupled with several years
of excess profit taxes, increased the temptation to falsify returns. The
staff of the Bureau of Internal Revenue was understaffed during the
war; investigations which might have sifted out fraudulent returns at
the time were temporarily passed by. The delay in investigation tended
to give a false feeling of security to persons who, having filed false
returns on an experimental basis, continued to do so relying on the
misguided impression that their schemes were successful. In addition
to creating new fortunes, the war produced many new taxpayers who
were unfamiliar with the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.
The successful prosecution of fraud claims constitutes a source of
substantial funds to the government. In addition to the millions of
dollars collected as evaded taxes, there are millions more collected as
penalties and interest. The attitude of the Treasury Department as to
the importance of fraud claims is indicated by the fact that recently
the Treasury asked Congress for funds to permit the hiring of 16,200
new employees for purposes of enforcement. A Senate sub-committee
was told that income tax evasions were estimated at a billion dollars a
year. Previously, there had been testimony before a Congressional
committee that fraud was suspected in 39,000 cases. The Penal Di-
vision of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which handles matters in
which criminal penalties are sought, had 554 cases pending at the close
of its fiscal year ending June 30, 1944, 712 in 1945, and 845 in 1946.2
How FRAUD CASES ARISE
Often fraud cases are ferreted out as a result of the routine check
of tax returns made by the various units of the Treasury Department.
If the Internal Revenue Agent or the Deputy Collector, in checking a
return, becomes suspicious of tax evasion, the taxpayer may become
subject to a fraud investigation. The government receives a great
many leads from such miscellaneous sources as personal letters from
1 Dorsheinter v. U.S., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 166, 173, 19 L.Ed. 187 (1868).
2 Report of Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1945, page 49; 1946, page 55.
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dissatisfied employees, general newspaper reports and state court pro-
ceedings. Even though an anonymous letter written to the Revenue
Department is apparently based on revenge and could be classified ex-
clusively as a crank letter, the Treasury will make a thorough investi-
gation. Many cases arose from the fact that the names of O.PA.
violators were reported to the Treasury.
Frequently information concerning a fraud is derived from in-
formers. Section 3792 of the Internal Revenue Code provides the
authority for payment of rewards to informers. The Commissioner
may pay informers up to ten per cent of the net amounts collected, in-
cluding tax, penalty, and interest.3 However, such payments are not
contractual, but depend on amounts which the Commissioner deems
suitable and cannot exceed in the aggregate the sum appropriated by
Congress for this purpose.4
WHAT Is FRAuD
An inquiry into the subject of what is fraud must necessarily be as
broad as the wildest taxpayer's imagination. The schemes and devices
which taxpayers may concoct run through various shadings, culminat-
ing in those which can be labeled fraudulent for the purpose of evad-
ing taxes.
One basic standard governs the determination of conduct which
results in a finding of fraud: such conduct must be "willful." Section
145(a) (failure to file), Section 145(b) (attempt to evade taxes), and
Section 145(c) (making of a false return) all provide that the con-
duct must be "willful."
The word "willful" has, quite understandably, evoked a tremen-
dous quantum of discussion by the courts. No short, sweet, all-en-
compassing definition has been determined. The facts of each case
must be scrutinized to see if willfulness exists. The Supreme Court
has said, "The word often denotes any act which is intentional, or
knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental, but when
used in a criminal statute, it generally means an act done with a bad
purpose [citations], without justifiable excuse [citations], stubbornly,
obstinately, perversely [citations]. The word is also employed to
characterize a thing done without ground for believing it lawful [cita-
tions], or conduct marked by careless disregard whether or not one
has the right so to act."5
In Spies v. United States,6 the Supreme Court said, "By way of
illustration, and not by way of limitation, we would think affirmative
3 T.D. 5379, 1944 C.B. 479.
4Ibid; also see Gordon v. U.S., 36 F.Supp. 639 (Ct.Cls., 1941). The informer
should file a formal claim on Treasury form No. 211.
5 U.S. v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394, 78 L.Ed. 381, 54 S.Ct. 223 (1933).
6317 U.S. 492, 499, 87 L.Ed. 418, 63 S.Ct. 364 (1943).
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willful attempt may be inferred from conduct such as keeping a double
set of books, making false entries or alterations, or false invoices or
documents, destruction of books or records, concealment of assets or
covering up sources of income, handling of one's affairs to avoid
making the records usual in transactions of the kind, and any conduct,
the likely effect of which would be to mislead or conceal."
In Mitchell v. Comm., 7 the court said, "Neglect, whether slight or
great, is not equivalent to the fraud with intention to evade tax named
in the statute. The fraud meant is actual, intentional wrongdoing, and
the intent required is the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to
be owing. Mere negligence does not establish either."
There is no clearer situation of willfully wrong conduct than that
of maintaining two sets of books. In Shinyu v. U.S.,3 the taxpayer
kept one set of books in Japanese and a second set in English. The
Japanese set showed about three times as much income as the English
set. The court found that he fraudulently reported his taxes based on
the English set.
Many cases of fraud are based on the fact that the taxpayer's bank
deposits are vastly in excess of his reported income. In Steinreich v.
Comm.,9 the taxpayer made the claim that his bank entries constituted
deposits from capital as opposed to income. Unfortunately for the tax-
payer in that case, however, a recent divorce proceedings contained
precise evidence of the taxpayer's assets. By referring to the prede-
termined list of assets, the Commissioner was able to establish that the
bank deposits must have been derived from income.10
Even though the income of the taxpayer may be derived from
illegal transactions, the presence of unexplained bank deposits may
justify a fraud finding." In Chadick v. U.S.,12 the taxpayer was a
County Commissioner who failed to report income because it was in
connection with graft in road construction. The civil fraud charge
was sustained. Such findings have also been sustained where there was
a failure to report income from the sale of "protection" to book-
makers,' 3 where the profits were derived from the policy or numbers
game,'4 and where bribes were paid to a union's business agent. 5
7118 F.(2d) 308, 310 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941).8148 F.(2d) 696 (C.C.A. 5th, 1945).
92 T.C.M. 1199 (Memo op., 1943).
IOJoseph Calafota v. Comm., 42 B.T.A. 881 (1940), aff'd. 124 F.(2d) 187(C.C.A. 3d, 1941); Hoefle v. Comm., 114 F.(2d) 713 (C.C.A. 6th, 1940).
-Capone v. U.S., 51 F.(2d) 609 (C.C.A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied 284 U.S. 669,
76 L.Ed. 566, 52 S.Ct. 44 (1931).
-77 F.(2d) 961 (C.C.A. 5th, 1935).
13 U.S. v. Skidmore, 123 F.(2d) 604 (C.C.A. 7th, 1941).
14 U.S. v. Miro, 60 F.(2d) 58 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932).
25 U.S. v. Conemerford, 64 F.(2d) 28 (C.C.A. 2d, 1933).
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In Robert Burd v. Comm.,'6 the following four factors were set
forth by the Board as governing its determination of fraud: (a) The
taxpayer had a bank account in an assumed name. (b) He purchased
$340,000.00 worth of property in his wife's name. (c) He transferred
his business to his wife. (d) He refused to make a statement to the
Revenue Agent. The decision contained this comment: "It is plain
that his purpose was to conceal the source of his income and evade
taxes. Such a state of fact rarely happens, it is designed.""l?
In an interesting case, a woman maintained accounts in several
different banks. She argued without success that she was concealing the
funds from her husband and not from the government.'8 Frequently
the fraud arises from false entries in books, such as erroneous inven-
tories. 9
In Allegheny Amusement Company v. Comm., 20 a corporation con-
sisting of four stockholders owned a building which it leased to a third
person. The corporation's sole function was to collect the rent and
pay the building's expenses. It maintained no office; its treasurer did
the necessary work from his home. The entire net income of the
corporation was divided and passed on to the corporate stockholders as
"compensation" to officers and, therefore, deducted from the corporate
return. It was held that since there were no real services rendered by
the officers, the deduction, was fraudulent.
Coast Carton Co. v. Comm., 21 involved much the same point. In the
latter case, the corporation paid a salary to the son of the corporation's
president, even after the son was dead.
In Weinstein v. Comm.,22 the taxpayer did not contest the Com-
missioner's proof to the effect that by understating income and over-
stating deductions, his income was improperly reflected to the extent
of $200,000.00 in one year. A finding of civil fraud was entered.
Back-dating a partnership agreement has been held to constitute
fraud.2 3 The person who witnessed the signatures to the partnership
agreement testified as to the date it was actually signed. The accountant
testified as to the date when he was first consulted concerning the
organization of a partnership. This was long after the date appearing
on the partnership instruments.
16 19 B.T.A. 734 (1930).
'17Ibid, p. 736.
'18 Rusinan v. Comm., 3 T.C.M. 922 (Memo op., 1944).
'
9 Maggio Bros. v. Comm., 6 T.C. 999 (1946) ; Liberty Hoosier Mills v. Coimmn.,
31 B.T.A. 64 (1934); C. R. Rich v. Conn., 6 B.T.A. 822 (1927).
2037 B.T.A. 12 (1938); also see Holmes & James, Inc. v. Conit., 30 B.T.A.
74 (1934).
21 149 F.(2d) 739 (C.C.A. 9th, 1945).
2233 B.T.A. 105 (1935).
23 Bumer v. Cowrin., 23 B.T.A. 1045 (1931).
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Time after time the following quotation from Gano v. Comm. 24
has been quoted approvingly: "A failure to report for taxation income
unquestionably received, such action being predicated on a patently
lame and untenable excuse, would seem to permit of no difference of
opinion. It evidences a fraudulent purpose."
It is to be noted that if the fraud penalties are assessed against the
corporation, and if the entire corporate stock is sold, the corporation
remains liable nevertheless. Even though there is a change of owner-
ship and management, the tax liability is not relieved.2 5
A corporate officer who virtually owned the corporation through
his stockholdings, converted corporate funds to his own use and failed
to include the amount on either his own or the corporation's return. It
was held to constitute a criminal attempt to evade taxes on the theory
that the payment was a taxable dividend to the stockholder.26
If a joint return has been filed, either spouse may be responsible
for the fraud penalties in spite of the fact that the fraud was com-
mitted entirely by one spouse.2 7 The filing of a joint return without
any objections by the wife, who does not file separately, will warrant a
presumption that the joint return was filed with her tacit consent.28
WHAT Is NOT FRAUD
The decided cases illustrate the hairline which distinguishes fraud
from non-fraud. The sanctified guess of twelve jurors may make one
man guilty of fraud, whereas another jury would reach a contrary re-
sult on the same facts. Where the issue is decided by the Tax Court
rather than a jury, we find that the judges are ultimately seeking to
determine what the taxpayer's intentions were; the facts and circum-
stances of each case may render all previous cases out of point.
We start with the premise that reductions of one's taxes by lawful
means is not condemned.2 9 The Supreme Court has said: "The legal
right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be
his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits,
cannot be doubted."2 0 However, as a practical matter, we know that
2419 B.T.A. 518, 533 (1930).
25 Erie Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Comm., 1 B.T.A. 531 (1925).
26 Currier v. U.S., 70 F.Supp. 219 (D.C. Mass., 1947), aff'd 166 F.(2d) 346
(C.C.A. 1st, 1948). Embezzled funds do not constitute taxable income:
Comm. v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 90 L.Ed. 752, 66 S.Ct. 546, 166 A.L.R. 884
(1946). In the Currier case the distinction was made that one cannot em-
bezzle from himself. Also see Petit v. Comm., 10 T.C. No. 161 (1948).27 Myrna S. Howell v. Comm., 10 T.C. No. 115 (1948).
28 Carroro v. Comm., 29 B.T.A. 646, 650 (1933).
29 Comm. v. McWilliams, 158 F.(2d) 637, 640 (C.C.A. 6th, 1946); Comm. v.
Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 288, 90 L.Ed. 670, 66 S.Ct. 532, 164 A.L.R. 1135 (1946);
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469, 79 L.Ed. 596, 55 S.Ct. 266, 97 A.L.R.
1355 (1935).
30 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469, 79 L.Ed. 596, 55 S.Ct. 266, 97 A.L.R.
1355 (1935).
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the dictum with reference to the difference between tax evasion and
tax avoidance frequently boils down to nothing more than lip service;
the government will vigorously seek to upset any transaction which
has tax reduction as its patent purpose.
The requirement of willfulness is sufficient to excuse from fraud
the man who can establish that his error was the result of negligence.
A taxpayer omitted $42,500.00 income in his return; it was held that
such conduct was not fraud but negligence.31 The taxpayer's secretary
made out his return and failed to include the taxable item; the tax-
payer did not check his return. It is to be noted, however, that there
was one favorable fact in that case: the omission was not discovered
even after two government audits, until the taxpayer himself volun-
teered it at a hearing.
The defense of negligence often goes a long way in avoiding a find-
ing of fraud. For example, in Mitchell v. Comm.,32 no civil fraud was
found even though the taxpayer was "grossly negligent" and his error
was one which would have been discovered "by the exercise of a slight
degree of care and diligence."
The ignorant man has a better chance of avoiding a fraud charge
than the learned man.- If the deficiency is very small, a fraud claim
may be defeated. Thus in Klise v. Comm.,3 4 the taxpayer admitted de-
ficiencies of $107.00 for one year and $18.73 for another year, but the
court passed over the fraud charges as to these years with the obser-
vation that the deficiencies were slight. A taxpayer who has made errors
against his interest along with those which reduced his tax is in a
strong position to resist a charge of fraud.35
Another situation in which the taxpayer can prevail is where there
are extraordinarily complicated facts which are hard to ascertain. 36
This is also true where the fraud relates to years long past. As the
court said in Delone v. Comm. :1 "Much would be excused to one
called upon to answer an eleven year old charge of fraud which would
not be allowed to one called upon to explain a recent transaction."
Reliance upon the advice of an attorney may or may not be a good
defense. In Griffiths v. Comm., s the taxpayer avoided the fraud be-
cause the error was based in part on the erroneous advice of an at-
torney. However, in Ross v. Comm., 9 the fraud charge was sustained.
3' Franklin v. Comrv., 34 B.T.A. 927 (1936).
3245 B.T.A. 822 (1941).
33 Lottie L. Clayton v. Comm., 7 T.C.M. 377 (Memo op., 1948); Scheer z'.
Cormm., 11 B.T.A. 836 (1928).34 10 B.T.A. 1234 (1928).
35 Grifiths v. Comm., 50 F.(2d) 782 (C.C.A. 7th, 1931).36 Arnold v. Comm., 14 B.T.A. 954 (1928).
3 100 F.(2d) 507 (C.C.A. 3d, 1938).
38 50 F. (2d) 782 (C.C.A. 7th, 1931).
3 13 B.T.A. 69 (1928).
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In this case the attorney who had been a deputy collector for five years
advised his client that the regulation did not correctly interpret the law.
The fraud charge has also been sustained where the taxpayer did not
establish for what purpose the attorney's advice was given.4
Where the error is the result of a misinterpretation of law on the
part of the taxpayer, the willfulness necessary for fraud may be miss-
ing.41 Misinterpretation of fact more readily supports a fraud charge
than misinterpretation of law.
Some of the most interesting cases in the fraud field arise in con-
nection with the problem of determining where bad judgment ends and
fraud begins.
42
In Delone v. Comm., 43 the taxpayers omitted about $100,000.00 of
income, and the court found that this was the result of a poor opinion.
The court said: "No one can be found guilty of a fraudulent untruth
by the mere expression of opinion." 4
The Supreme Court has said in Spies v. U.S. :-5 "It is not the pur-
pose of the law to penalize frank difference of opinion or innocent
errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care."
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS
A large number of sections of the Revenue Code are devoted to the
declaration of penalties and punishments for fraud48 The most fre-
quently cited section involving civil fraud is Section 293(b) which
provides for a fifty per cent penalty for fraud intended to evade taxes.
Section 145 is the most commonly encountered section relative to
criminal penalties. The first subsection of Section 145 makes the will-
ful failure to file a return a misdemeanor, and the punishment is im-
prisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not more than
$10,000.00, or both. The second subsection of Section 145 makes
the willful attempt to evade tax a felony, and the punishment is im-
prisonment for not more than five years or a fine of $10,000.00, or both.
Since failure to file is only a misdemeanor, it is apparent that such
course is safer from the criminal standpoint than filing a false return.
However, it may be more expensive financially. This is because the
Commissioner, under Section 276(a) may assess a deficiency "at any
4
oEdmond B. Bronson v. Comm., 7 T.C.M. 415 (Memo op., 1948); Plunkett &
Co. v. Cowm., 42 B.T.A. 464, 472 (1940).
41Hirsch v. Comm., 42 B.T.A. 566 (1940).
421n Landers Bros. Co. v. Comnm., 17 B.T.A. 1078, 1081 (1929) it was said:
"Even if the petitioner was mistaken as to the deductibility of its alleged
loss, an error in judgment as to what does, and what does not, fall within
the purview of the statute is not an indication of bad faith to be branded
as fraud or penalized as such."
4 Supra note 37.
44Ibid, p. 509.
45317 U.S. 492, 496, 87 L.Ed. 418, 63 S.Ct. 364 (1943).
46 For a useful chart of such penalties see: Gutkin, "Tax Law Violations,"
Sixth Annual Institute on Federal Taxation, p. 222.
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time" where there has been a false return or a failure to file. At the
time of this assessment, the government may assess a penalty of
twenty-five per cent for the non-filing under Section 291(a) and fifty
per cent for the fraud under Section 293(b). Thus, the total penalty
may amount to seventy-five per cent.47 The fifty per cent penalty ap-
plies to the entire deficiency even though only a part of it is due to
fraud.4
Section 3748(a) of the Code fixes the period of limitations under
Section 145(a) at three years and under 145(b) at six years. If the
taxpayer is absent from the district where the offense is committed,
the limitation period may be extended by the time of the absence.49
Where there is a failure to file, the crime is committed when the return
should have been filed. Under Section 145 (b), the crime is committed
when the overt act is done.
In 1942, Congress suspended the statute of limitations until three
years after the termination of hostilities for acts involving the defraud-
ing of the United States. 0
BURDEN OF PROOF
The burden of proof varies depending on whether the fraud is to
be the basis of criminal or civil penalties. For civil penalties, the proof
must be clear and convincing. 1 Where criminal penalties are sought,
the government's burden of proof is stronger: it must be beyond a
reasonable doubt.8 2
-The two types of penalties are sufficiently different to support the
proposition that acquittal on a criminal charge is not jeopardy so as to
bar an action for civil penalties, and, on the other hand, a denial of the
government's demand for civil fraud penalties is not res adjudicata so
as to bar criminal action. As the court said in Spies v. U.S.: "Invoca-
tion of one does not exclude resort to the other."' '
The burden of proof may be met by circumstantial evidence. In
Frank Harris v. Comnm.,5 the court accepted the government's evidence
of the taxpayer's increase in net worth as shown by mortgage notes
4 Kessler v. Comm., 39 B.T.A. 646 (1939); Epstein v. Camnz., 34 B.T.A. 925(1936); Brecher v. Comm., 27 B.T.A. 1108 (1933); McLaughlin v. Comm.,
29 B.T.A. 247 (1933).
4sMcKeen v. Comm., 39 B.T.A. 913 (1939).
49 U.S. v. Anthracite Brewing Co., 11 F.Supp. 1019 (D.C. Pa., 1935).5oAct of August 24, 1942, Pub.L. 706, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 56 Stat. 747, 18
U.S.C.A. 590a.
5'Maddos v. Comn., 40 B.T.A. 572 (1939), aff'd 114 F.(2d) 548 (C.C.A. 3d,
1940); Budd v. Conun., 43 F.(2d) 509 (C.C.A. 3d, 1930).52Cleckman v. U.S., 80 F.(2d) 394 (C.C.A. 8th, 1935), cert. denied 297 U.S.
709, 80 L.Ed. 996, 56 S.Ct. 501 (1936); U.S. v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 78
L.Ed. 381, 54 S.Ct. 223 (1933).
53 317 U.S. 492, 495, 87 L.Ed. 418, 63 S.Ct. 364 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 82 L.Ed. 917, 58 S.Ct. 630 (1938).
54 7 T.C.M. 195 (Mfemo op., 1948).
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and bank deposits. The taxpayer's protestations that "he could not
remember" did not absolve him from civil fraud.
CONDUCTING THE FRAUD CASE
The manner of handling the fraud case presents a vigorous chal-
lenge to the attorney. Particularly where criminal penalties are con-
templated does the manner in which the case is conducted assume
importance.- s Shall the client cooperate with the Revenue Agent?
Shall he make a full and voluntary disclosure? Shall he claim or waive
his constitutional pirotections?
The principal question which the attorney is compelled to decide
early in the case is whether the government's necessary proof can be
obtained without the client's assistance. If the government determines
that criminality is involved, the failure of the taxpayer to cooperate
will seldom do more than delay the government's assembling of the
facts needed for conviction. On the other hand, a cooperative attitude
may influence the Internal Revenue Agent to recommend against prose-
cution. Even if prosecution is had, the jury hearing the case may form
an unfavorable conclusion when testimony is produced on the de-
fendant's uncooperativeness. In the event a finding of guilt is entered,
the court may tend toward severity of sentence where the taxpayer was
an obstructionist.
There is a point at which cooperation may end and self-conviction
begins. For example, if the Revenue Agent were to request a balance
sheet showing what assets the taxpayer had at the beginning of the
period in question, the attorney must reflect carefully before supplying
this data. It is a powerful tool in the hands of the Agent since any
increment in assets during this period should be reflected in the income
tax returns. If the Commissioner can pin the taxpayer down to a
designated amount of wealth in the first year under investigation, he
is a long way along the road to showing unreported gains. Of course,
if this material can be procured elsewhere by the government, the
taxpayer only hurts himself by withholding it.
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution pro-
tect the taxpayer from unreasonable searches and seizures and from giv-
ing evidence against himself. Under these guarantees, the taxpayer
may properly decline to answer the questions of the Internal Revenue
Agents or to exhibit private papers and records in his possession. Cor-
porations do not have this protection nor does the protection cover
records in the possession of third parties. If an employee of the tax-
payer is questioned, he too may claim these rights, but the Commis-
55 The attorney himself may be subject to penalties for advising a tax fraud:
I.R.C. Sec. 3793(b).
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sioner may require his evidence in return for the granting of immunity.
If the immunity is granted, the witness must testify. He may not, out
of loyalty to his employer, choose to keep silent despite the granting of
immunity.
The constitutional rights of the taxpayer may be waived by him
and will be considered waived if he has permitted the Agent to make
an examination of his books.56
It has been held that the Fifth Amendment does not give protection
to the man who has failed to file a return.5 7
It is worth noting that admissions made to an accountant or records
left in his custody are available to the government, whereas an attorney
is shielded by reason of the privileged relationship of attorney and
client.
Section 3631 limits the Commissioner to one examination of the
taxpayer for each taxable year, unless the latter is given written notice
of the necessity for an additional inspection. This is a possible aid to
the taxpayer which appears to have been availed of only rarely.
A more substantial aid to the taxpayer is that afforded by the re-
quirement that the government must assert a basis for fraud in order
to examine records relating to years which would otherwise be barred
by the statute of limitations. The taxpayer may gain information by
requiring the government to show cause for asserting the claim of
fraud.5s
Should the taxpayer seek to avert the criminal fraud charge by a
voluntary disclosure? And if so, how shall he make the disclosure?
The Commissioner's rule is that if an investigation has not been started
a disclosure by the taxpayer will eliminate the criminal aspects. An
important question remains: when is an investigation initiated?
The leading case relative to disclosures is United States v. Lustig. 9
Lustig called upon the Collector almost thirty days after the Intelli-
gence Unit had started to make inquiries. The claim of immunity was
rejected.
The disclosure may be made by means of an amended return. This
has the advantage of being simple and routine; however, it may form
the basis for a new fraud charge unless scrupulously made.60 A better
56Nicola v. U.S., 72 F.(2d) 780, 784 (C.C.A. 3d, 1934): "The constitutional
guarantee is for the benefit of the witness and unless invoked is deemed to
be waived."
5 Reg. 111, Sec. 29.145-1; U.S. v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263, 71 L.Ed. 1037,
47 S.Ct. 607, 51 A.L.R. 1020 (1927).5sMartin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F. (2d) 731 (C.C.A. 9th, 1942);
Zimmerman v. Wilson, 105 F.(2d) 583 (C.C.A. 3d, 1939).
59163 F.(2d) 85 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947).6 Levy v. U.S., 271 Fed. 942 (C.C.A. 3d, 1921).
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method would seem to be a letter to the Collector setting forth the
full story. An offer in compromise has the same type of drawback as
an amended return: if it is false, it is a new crime under Section 3762
of the Code.
Section 3761(a) allows the Commissioner, with approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Under Secretary or the Assistant Sec-
retary, to compromise both civil and criminal matters. It is interesting
to note that in Wight v. Rindskopf,6 ' the Wisconsin Supreme Court
expressed the view that the settlement of a criminal charge was the
equivalent of compounding a felony. It therefore denied legal fees
for services rendered in connection with the compromise. Chief Justice
Ryan said: "We could no more enforce contracts compounding or
tending to compound crime coming from the federal jurisdiction, than
contracts of polygamy from the jurisdiction of Utah or of Turkey. 6 2
Even though the voluntary disclosure may succeed in removing the
criminal charges, it will not wipe out the civil fraud penalty.6 3
PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
A brief note may be helpful as to the procedure followed in the
processing of a criminal fraud case from investigation to trial. The
case is forwarded by the Intelligence Unit, via the Special Agent in
Charge, to the Regional Penal Division. After that, it is reviewed by
the Penal Division of the Office of the Chief Counsel of the Bureau.
Thereafter, it proceeds to the Commissioner's office wherefrom it is
taken to an Assistant Attorney General in the Tax Division of the
Department of Justice. The Assistant Attorney General relies solely on
the report given him by the Commissioner. The case is not investigated
independently by the FBI. The Intelligence Unit acts in the capacity
of the FBI in federal tax matters. The file is studied by an attorney
in the Criminal Section of the Tax Division and then is forwarded to the
United States Attorney in the particular district where trial is to be
had. It is the U.S. Attorney's job to seek to place the case on for trial.
If the charge is a felony, the U.S. Attorney will present the case to
the grand jury. If it is for an offense punishable by imprisonment for
one year or less, an indictment is not needed; an information is suf-
ficient.
CONCLUSION
We may expect fraud cases to become increasingly important. The
manner of handling the fraud case constitutes a real challenge to the
practitioner because no two cases are exactly alike.
6143 Wis. 344, 359 (1877).
62 Ibid, p. 364.
63 Garden City Feeder Co. v. Cowm., 27 B.T.A. 1132 (1933).
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The Tax Court recently indicated the individuality of each case in
Lottie L. Clayton v. Comm.: "Fraud is a subjective matter; and the
question in cases involving fraud is whether the particular taxpayer,
acting in the specific factual situation disclosed by the particular rec-
ord, acted with fraudulent intent.""4
The absence of a general rule for the handling of a fraud case
necessitates great care and conscientious consideration by the taxpayer's
counsel.
64 7 T.C.M. 377, 379 (Memo op., 1948).
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